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Abstract
This paper deals with optimal income and commodity taxation in
an economy, where alcohol is an externality-generating consumption
good. In our model, alcohol can be bought domestically, imported (via
border trade) or produced illegally. Border trade implies an incentive
to set the domestic alcohol tax below the marginal social damage of
alcohol, and to tax (subsidize) commodities which are complementary
with (substitutable for) alcohol. In addition, since leisure and alcohol
consumption are generally nonseparable, the income tax will also be
used as a corrective instrument. On the other hand, the desire to
reduce the illegal production may generally aﬀect the optimal income
and commodity taxes in either direction. One possible (and arguably
realistic) outcome is, nevertheless, that the desire to avoid the illegal
1production works to reduce both the alcohol tax and the marginal
income tax rate.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Between 1996 and 2003, alcohol consumption increased by approximately
29 per cent in Sweden1. This is, at least in part, attributable to higher per
capita import quotas in combination with a 45 per cent decrease in the Danish
alcohol tax. A higher level of alcohol consumption is typically expected to
have several negative eﬀects for society. First, it may increase the frequency
of alcohol-related diseases in the population. In case health care in publicly
provided, this implies welfare costs due to ﬁscal external eﬀects. Second, a
higher level of alcohol consumption may also aﬀect the production side of
the economy via increases in sick-absenteeism and/or reduced productivity.
Alarmed by this development, the Swedish government appointed a com-
mission during 2003, the aim of which was to put forward proposals regarding
our future alcohol policy; in particular alcohol taxation. In an interim re-
port, presented in August 2004, one of the key suggestions was to reduce the
Swedish alcohol tax by 40 per cent. Although this may lead to an increase
in the total consumption of alcohol, the main motivation was that a lower
tax is likely to reduce the amount of imported alcohol; an indication that
the commission believed that the current alcohol policy does not fulﬁll its
main objective of reducing the alcohol consumption2. The Swedish situation
1See SOU 2004:86.
2A related issue addressed in the economics literature is that border trade makes the
domestic alcohol taxes less eﬃcient as means of collecting revenues; see Crawford and
2is not unique. The reduction of the alcohol tax in Denmark mentioned above
was a response to the lower level of taxation in Germany. Similarly, Finland
reduced its alcohol tax by 44 per cent due to the lower level of taxation in
Estonia. Also in Denmark and Finland, the main motivation for the tax
reductions seems to have been to avoid private import of alcohol.
The political environment in which these policy reforms are suggested
features at least two important characteristics. First, the countries do not
seem to cooperate with respect to alcohol policy. Instead, each country
chooses its policy in isolation while treating the policies of other countries as
exogenous. Second, in today’s world, free trade agreements may eﬀectively
rule out the use of tariﬀs and similar trade barriers. The latter implies that
individual countries do not have access to instruments, which would make
it possible to control the import of alcohol. Therefore, these characteristics
suggest that ’alcohol policy’ should be thought upon as a decision problem
in a second best framework. An interesting and important question then
emerges; what does ’the optimal alcohol policy’ look like at the national
level, if neither international cooperation nor trade policy is implementable?
The purpose of this paper is to address alcohol taxation in the context of
an optimal tax problem. Our analysis is based on a representative agent
model with two consumption goods, one of which is alcohol. There are
three ways for the consumers of acquiring alcohol; (i) buying alcohol on
the domestic market, (ii) importing alcohol via border trade and (iii) illegal
Tanner (1995) and Crawford et al. (1999). Both studies estimate the demand for diﬀerent
types of alcohol using data from the U.K. The results show that, while the duties on beer
and wine appear to be set below their revenue maximizing levels, the authors were not
able to the reject that the duty on spirits is revenue maximizing. The main diﬀerence
between the two studies is that Crawford et al. incorporate cross-price eﬀects between
diﬀerent types of alcohol.
3production of alcohol (moonshining). Excessive alcohol consumption causes
health damage which may, in turn, necessitate medical treatment. We assume
that health care is publicly provided and ﬁnanced via tax revenues, meaning
that alcohol consumption gives rise to a ﬁscal external eﬀect3. In addition,
although our study focuses on alcohol taxation, the qualitative results can
be generalized to any externality-generating good, which is subject to border
trade.
The government in our paper faces a mixed tax problem, where the set
of tax instruments contains a nonlinear income tax and linear commodity
taxes. Such a framework provides a reasonably realistic description of the
tax instruments which a government has at its disposal. It also implies that
the use of distortionary taxation is a consequence of optimization; it is not
a consequence of restrictions on the tax instruments. To be able to concen-
trate on the corrective role of taxation, we follow some of the earlier litera-
ture on optimal taxation under imperfect competition, e.g. Fuest and Huber
(1997) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a, 2004b), by disregarding motives
for distortionary taxes that also apply under perfect competition (e.g. asym-
metric information). Therefore, the motives for using distortionary taxes
discussed here are solely related to the external eﬀects of alcohol consump-
tion. This simpliﬁcation does not reﬂect a belief that other motives for using
distortionary taxes, such as the desire to redistribute among consumers in
an economy with asymmetric information, are unimportant; only that they
are well understood from earlier studies.
3One can also think of other external eﬀects of alcohol (e.g. external eﬀects in the
production due to inﬂuences on the stock of human capital). Although we limit our
analysis to a ﬁscal health cost externality, the results are easily generalized to any negative
externality associated with alcohol.
4The optimal tax policy derived in the paper will be compared with that
of a ’standard’ model, which neither contains the possibility of importing
alcohol via border trade nor illegal production4. Since private imports erodes
the tax base for alcohol, we cannot solely rely on the domestic alcohol tax
as a means of internalizing the external eﬀect of alcohol. The reason is that
the number of variables one would like to control via tax policy exceeds the
number of policy instruments. As a consequence, the commodity taxes on
other (nonalcoholic) goods as well as the income tax should also be used for
corrective purposes. The results show that the external eﬀect associated with
alcohol consumption provides an incentive to tax (subsidize) goods, which are
complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol. This result can be related
to the ’additivity property’, which was ﬁrst derived by Sandmo (1975) in
the environmental economics literature and further discussed by Pirttilä and
Tuomala (1997) in the context of mixed taxation5. The additivity property
means that the marginal social damage should enter the tax formula for the
externality-generating good, although it should have no direct eﬀect on the
tax formulas for the other goods. Therefore, in our framework, the additivity
property does not apply, since the marginal social damage of alcohol directly
4For previous research on alcohol taxation in the absence of border trade and illegal
production, see e.g. Pogue and Sgontz (1989) and Sgontz (1993). The basic issue in
the ﬁrst paper is how to set the alcohol tax in an economy, which distinguishes between
abusers and nonabusers of alcohol. This analysis relates, in turn, to Diamond (1973), who
addresses corrective pricing in case the external eﬀects vary with the individuals causing
them (although prices are uniform). The second paper extends the analysis by considering
the mix of alcohol and other taxes under a tax revenue requirement. See also Parry (2003)
for a welfare analysis of alcohol and other taxes in the context of a numerical model applied
to the U.K.
5See also the related literature on environmental policy in the context of mixed taxation,
i.e. Cremer and Gahvari (2001), Cremer et al. (2001) and Aronsson and Blomquist (2004).
5aﬀects the tax formula for the nonalcoholic good. The results also imply that,
if alcohol and labor are complements (substitutes), there will an incentive to
increase (decrease) the hours of work via the income tax system. Adding
illegal production of alcohol to the analysis makes the model much more
complex. The joint inﬂuence of boarder trade and illegal production does
not provide a clear incentive to choose a lower commodity tax on alcohol
than in the standard model, where the government has full control of the
externality-generating tax base. However, a possible (and arguably realistic)
outcome is, nevertheless, that the desire to avoid illegal production works to
reduce both the alcohol tax and the marginal income tax rate.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic
model. The optimal tax policy is characterized in Section 3, and we divide
the analysis in two parts. First, we characterize the optimal tax policy in
the absence of illegal production of alcohol, implying that we are focusing on
the consequences of border trade for domestic policy. This approach seems
reasonable, considering that the implications the for optimal tax policy of
allowing consumers to buy alcohol abroad diﬀer substantially from those
associated with illegal production. It is also motivated by evidence suggesting
that the domestic illegal production may be small relative to the size of
private import6. Second, we discuss the consequences of allowing for illegal
production of alcohol, meaning that the implications of border trade and
illegal production are addressed simultaneously. The results are summarized
and discussed in Section 4.
6For Sweden, it has been estimated that out of the total alcohol consumption during
2003, 26 per cent came from private imports (where the numbers for legal and illegal
imports are 22 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively), while 6 per cent came from domestic
illegal production (SOU 2004:86).
62 The Model
Consider an economy with identical consumers7, the number of which is nor-
malized to one. Consumer preferences are deﬁned by the utility function
u(c,x,z),w h e r ec is a commodity with no alcoholic content, to be called
’nonalcoholic good’ in what follows, x is alcohol and z is leisure. We assume
that the function u(·) is increasing in c and z as well as strictly quasicon-
cave. We also assume that alcohol causes health damage8;ap r o p e r t yw h i c h
for simplicity is embedded in the relationship between u(·) and x9.T h e
health consequences of alcohol imply that the individual may need medical
treatment. Since health care is publicly provided by assumption, the cost of
medical treatment is ﬁnanced via tax revenues.
7Recall that our paper focuses on the consequences of border trade and illegal produc-
tion for the optimal tax mix; issues which can be addressed in the context of a represen-
tative agent model.
8Since alcohol is a commodity to which consumers may become addicted, another
possible approach would be to analyze consumer behavior within the framework of a
rational addiction model; see Becker and Murphy (1988). However, this approach may
necessitate a dynamic model, which is analytically more complicated. Since the aspects to
be addressed in this paper are captured by a static model, analytical convenience motivates
our choice of using such a model.
9This means that, although the marginal utility of alcohol must be positive at the
optimum, the relationship between u(·) and x needs not necessarily be monotonous. A
more formal (yet equivalent) approach would be to incorporate a health indicator, h(x),i n
the utility function, such that the utility function changes to read ˇ u(c,x,z,h(x)),w h e r e








For ’normal’ levels of x,t h eﬁrst positive terms dominates, whereas the second negative
term may take over for suﬃciently large quantities.
7In our model, there are three ways of acquiring alcohol for the consumer;
(i) buying on the domestic market, (ii) imports and (iii) illegal production.
The amount of alcohol bought on the domestic market is denoted by xd,
whereas xf denotes the amount of alcohol imported via border trade. The
consumer prices on domestic and imported alcohol are denoted by qx and
qf
x, respectively, where qf
x is treated as ﬁxed by the domestic government.




, which is increasing and strictly convex in its argument. The
private, illegal, production of alcohol is deﬁned by the production function
xu = f (lu),w h e r elu is the amount of labor used to produce alcohol and
avoid detection. We assume that f (lu) is increasing and strictly concave in
its argument. The concavity of f(·) reﬂects the idea that, as an individual
increases his/her illegal production of alcohol, relatively more time must be
spent avoiding detection and relatively less time can be spent in the actual
production.
The optimal tax problem below will be deﬁned in terms of a conditional
indirect utility function and conditional demand functions. Therefore, follow-
ing Christiansen (1984), it is convenient to solve the consumer’s optimization
problem in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we maximize utility conditional on
the hours of work in the oﬃcial labor market, l.T h i sp r o b l e mi sw r i t t e n
max














f + f (l
u) (3)
8where qc is the consumer price of the nonalcoholic good, and b is the after-tax
income which is treated as ﬁx e di nt h eﬁrst stage. Note also that we have
substituted the time constraint, z = H − l − lu, into the utility function,
where H is the time endowment. To simplify the analysis, we assume a
linear technology, where the wage rate and the producer prices are ﬁxed10.
The consumer prices are given by qc = pc +tc and qx = px +tx, respectively,
where pc and px are producer prices, while tc and tx are commodity taxes. By
assuming interior solutions, i.e. x,xd,x f,c,l u > 0,t h eﬁrst stage optimization
implicitly deﬁnes the conditional demand and ’supply’ functions
x = x(b,l,qc,q x), x
d = x
d (b,l,qc,q x), x
f = x
f (qx),( 4 )
c = c(b,l,qc,q x) and l
u = l
u (b,l,qc,q x)
where the ﬁxed parameter qf
x has been suppressed for notational convenience.
Note that xf is written as a function only of qx,s i n c et h eﬁrst order condition




x. Strict convexity of the cost function
implies that xf is increasing in qx. Substituting the conditional demand and
supply functions into the direct utility function and using the time constraint
gives the conditional indirect utility function
v = v(b,l,qc,q x) (5)
In the second stage, l is chosen to maximize the conditional indirect utility
function subject to the budget constraint b = wl−T (wl),w h e r ew is the wage
rate earned in the oﬃcial labor market and T (·) the income tax function.
The ﬁrst order condition is given by





+ vl =0 (6)
in which vb = ∂v(·)/∂b and vl = ∂v(·)/∂l = −∂u(·)/∂z denote the marginal
utilities of private income and labor, respectively, whereas T

= ∂T(wl)/∂(wl)
is the marginal income tax rate.
3T h e O p t i m a l T a x P r o b l e m
T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n ti st om a x i m i z et h ew e l f a r eo ft h er e p r e s e n -
tative individual, v = v(b,l,qc,q x), subject to its budget constraint. The
tax instruments are income and commodity taxes, and the tax revenues are
used to ﬁnance the expenditure on health care. Since we are focusing on
tax policy, we disregard public policies aimed at detecting illegal production.
The budget constraint can be written
T (wl)+tcc + txx
d − ρ(x)=0 (7)
where ρ(x) is the cost of health care, which is increasing in the total con-
sumption of alcohol, x. Note also that the amount of alcohol bought in
the domestic market, xd, constitutes the tax base for the domestic alcohol
tax. The consumer price on imported alcohol, qf
x,i st r e a t e da sﬁxed by the
government.
Recall that T(·) is a general income tax, meaning that it can be used to
implement any desired combination of (l,b). I ti sc o n v e n i e n tt ou s el and
b directly, instead of the parameters of T (·), as decision variables in the
optimal tax problem. Therefore, l, b, tc and tx, together, constitute the set
10of decision variables. The Lagrangean becomes
L = v(·)+γ
 
wl − b + tcc(·)+txx
d (·) − ρ(x(·))
 
(8)
where xd (·)=x(·) − xf (·) − f (lu (·)), while γ is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the budget constraint. The expression within square brackets
is computed by using T = wl − b.
The ﬁrst order conditions are presented in the Appendix. As we men-
tioned above, the analysis will be divided in two parts. First, we characterize
the optimal public policy in the absence of illegal production of alcohol, im-
plying that we are focusing on the consequences for the optimal tax policy of
allowing for alcohol imports. Second, we discuss the consequences of allow-
ing for illegal production of alcohol, meaning that the implications of imports
and illegal production are addressed simultaneously.
3.1 Case 1: No Illegal Production of Alcohol
In terms of the original model, this case means that xu = f(lu)=0 .L e tu s
begin by discussing the commodity tax structure. Denote the compensated
demand functions by ˜ x, ˜ xf and ˜ c, respectively. By substituting equation (A2)





























To be able to interpret the optimal tax policy implicit in equation system (9),
consider ﬁrst the special case with no private import of alcohol, i.e. when
xf =0 . Solving equation system (9) for x = xd, and then using the ﬁrst
order condition for l in the Appendix, gives





This situation, which will be referred to as the ’Standard Case’, summarizes
the conventional results of optimal taxation in a representative agent model
with an external eﬀect. The intuition is that the government is, in this case,
able to reach the ﬁrst best by fully internalizing the external eﬀect. This
is accomplished by choosing tx equal to the marginal cost of health care,
ρ

. On the other hand, and regardless of the pattern of complementarity or
substitutability between c and x, the optimal tax on the nonalcoholic good,
tc, is zero. These results conﬁrm the additivity property of Sandmo (1975).
Note also that the marginal income tax rate is equal to zero in the Standard
Case, implying that the income tax becomes a pure lump-sum tax.
Having brieﬂy addressed the Standard Case, let us return to the general
case with border trade summarized by equation system (9), in which we have












to be the determinant of the matrix on the left hand side of equation system
(9). By applying Cramer’s rule, while using xd = x − xf,w ec a nd e r i v e 11;
11Note that the tax rules in Proposition 1 are written in terms of derivatives of the
compensated (not the Mashallian) conditional demand functions. The reason is that the
tax formulas are derived by combining the ﬁrst order conditions for tc, tx and b,s i n c et h e
eﬃcient tax structure presupposes an optimal income tax. Therefore, changes in tc and tx
will be accompanied by a simultaneous change in b in order to balance the government’s
budget. Since the latter is also interpretable as a change in b such that the utility is
unchanged, the derivatives of the conditional compensated demand functions appear in
the tax rules.
12Proposition 1 In the presence of border trade, eﬃcient taxation means that



















Consider ﬁrst the interpretation of the optimal alcohol tax, tx.I nc o m -
parison with the Standard Case, where tx = ρ

, there is an additional term
on the right hand side of the tax formula, which arises as a direct conse-
quence of border trade. Since ∂˜ xf/∂qx > 0 and ∂˜ c/∂qc < 0, this additional
term is negative and constitutes an incentive to set the alcohol tax below the
marginal social damage of alcohol12, ρ. The intuition is that border trade
erodes the tax base for the alcohol tax, meaning that tx is no longer a perfect
instrument to control the total consumption of alcohol, x = xd+xf.I n s t e a d ,
since tx is now a less eﬃcient policy instrument than in the Standard Case,
there is an incentive to set the alcohol tax such that tx < ρ

. In addition, note
that the more sensitive border trade is to alcohol taxation, i.e. the greater
∂˜ xf/∂qx, the lower will be the optimal alcohol tax relative to the marginal
social damage of alcohol.
Another diﬀerence, in comparison with the Standard Case, is that the tax
on the nonalcoholic good, tc, will now be used as an additional instrument to
correct for the external eﬀect. The intuition is that, since tx does not fully
12In Christiansen (2003), a similar qualitative result is established; although in a dif-
ferent context. He ﬁnds that the optimal commodity tax on an externality-generating
consumption good falls short of the marginal social damage, if the externality-generating
consumption good is subject to border trade. At the same time, his paper has a diﬀerent
focus than ours, and he does not address how other policy instruments (other than taxes
the externality-generating consumption goods) can be used for corrective purposes.
13internalize the external eﬀect, the government has an incentive to use other
instruments in order to inﬂuence the alcohol consumption. Proposition 1 is
interpretable to mean that, if the nonalcoholic good is complementary with
(substitutable for) alcohol in the sense that ∂˜ xd/∂qc < 0 (> 0), then the
optimal tax on the nonalcoholic good is positive (negative). In other words,
there is an incentive to tax (subsidize) goods which are complementary with
(substitutable for) alcohol. As a consequence, the additivity property no
longer applies. This is basically due to the fact that the government wants to
inﬂuence four goods (c, xd, xf and l), although it has only three instruments
at its disposal (tc, tx and T).
Let us continue by characterizing the marginal income tax rate. Consider
Proposition 2;
Proposition 2 In the presence of border trade, eﬃcient taxation means that




















Proof: See the Appendix.
It is once again useful to compare the results with those that would emerge
in the Standard Case, where the marginal income tax rate is equal to zero.
In an economy with border trade, on the other hand, Proposition 2 suggests
that the government has an incentive to use the income tax as an additional
instrument to reduce the alcohol consumption. The intuition behind the ﬁrst
part of the expression within the square bracket relates to whether the hours
of work are complementary with, or substitutable for, for alcohol. As such,
if the hours of work are complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol in
the sense that ∂˜ x/∂l>0 (< 0), there is an incentive to decrease (increase)
the hours of work from the point of view of the government. This can, in
14turn, be accomplished by choosing a higher (lower) marginal income tax
rate than otherwise. For instance, if alcohol and leisure are complements
(which appears to be a reasonable assumption), then this argument provides
a rationale for lowering the marginal income tax rate.
To interpret the second part of the expression within square brackets, it is
necessary to bear in mind that the corrective role of income taxation in this
economy is to reduce the consumption of alcohol; there is no reason to directly
distort the consumption of the other commodity (the nonalcoholic good does
not give rise to external eﬀects). Therefore, if a change in l (induced by
a change in the income tax), nevertheless, distorts the choice underlying
the consumption of the nonalcoholic good, there will be an incentive for
the government to adjust the tax structure accordingly. The second part of
the expression within the square bracket can be understood in terms of the
answer to the following question: if a change in l (via an adjustment of the
income tax) is used to reduce the consumption of alcohol, and if ∂˜ c/∂l  =0 ,
how should qc be changed in order to keep ˜ c ﬁxed at, say, ¯ c?D i ﬀerentiating
¯ c =˜ c(u,l,qc,q x) with respect to l and qc,w eh a v e
∂qc
∂l



























The interpretation now becomes straight forward. Suppose that ∂qc/∂l>
0, implying that an increase in l must be accompanied by a higher qc for
˜ c to be constant. Then, if the nonalcoholic good is complementary with
(substitutable for) alcohol in the sense that ∂˜ x/∂qc < 0 (> 0), the second
part of the expression within the square bracket constitutes an incentive to
15increase (decrease) the hours of work, which is accomplished by choosing a
lower (higher) marginal income tax rate than otherwise. If ∂qc/∂l<0,o n
the other hand, the opposite argument applies.
As a ﬁnal concern in this subsection, let us brieﬂyt u r nt ot h em a r g i n a l
cost of public funds, MCPF, which is deﬁned as γ/vb. In the Standard Case,
it is easy to show that MCPF =1 , since the Standard Case means that we
are able to implement the ﬁr s tb e s tr e s o u r c ea l l o c a t i o n .F o rt h em o r eg e n e r a l
model with border trade, MCPF will generally diﬀer from one. By using




















Although MCPF ≶ 1 in general, one would be inclined to argue that
MCPF < 1 is the most likely outcome for the model set out here. To see
this, suppose (as one would normally expect) that ∂x/∂b>0 and ∂c/∂b>0
at the optimum. Then, since ∂˜ xf/∂qx > 0 and ∂˜ c/∂qc < 0,t h eﬁrst part
of the formula for φ works to reduce MCPF below one. Then, a suﬃcient
condition for MCPF <1 is that the two consumption goods are weak sub-
stitutes in the sense that ∂˜ x/∂qc ≥ 0. Note also that this condition is not
necessary; if the two goods are complementary, implying that ∂˜ x/∂qc < 0,
MCPF will still fall short of one, provided that the compensated cross price
eﬀect is not too large in absolute value. The intuition is straight forward;
since tx < ρ, possibly in combination with tc < 0 (recall that the nonalco-
holic good will be subsidized if ∂˜ x/∂qc > 0), a larger part of the tax revenues
will here be collected via the income tax than in the Standard Case. As
such, this is likely to imply that the government relies on lump-sum taxation
16to a greater extent than in the Standard Case, since the general income tax
contains a lump-sum element.
3.2 Case 2: Illegal Production of Alcohol
Adding illegal production of alcohol to the analysis, the domestic demand
for alcohol changes to read xd = x−xf −xu,w h e r exu = f(lu) is the amount
illegally produced with labor input lu. To simplify the presentation, let us


































By applying the same technique as in Proposition 1, we obtain the following
result regarding commodity taxation;
Proposition 3 In the presence of border trade and illegal production, eﬃ-




















































17The second row of each tax formula in Proposition 3 corresponds to the
special case with no illegal production discussed in the previous subsection.
As such, these terms are equivalent to, and have the same interpretations as,
the tax formulas presented in Proposition 1. On the other hand, the terms
in the ﬁrst row of each formula did not appear in the previous subsection;
they are due to the assumption that part of the time endowment is spent on
illegal production of alcohol.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h et a xf o r m u l a si nP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,tx does no longer nec-
essarily fall short of the marginal social damage of alcohol (as it did in the
absence of border trade). In addition, we can no longer determine whether
the nonalcoholic good should be taxed or subsidized simply by analyzing
whether the two consumption goods are complements or substitutes in terms
of compensated cross price eﬀects. The intuition is that the government now
wants to inﬂuence ﬁve variables (c, xd, xf, xu and l), although it still has
only three instruments at its disposal (tc, tx and T). As a consequence, the
number of incentive eﬀects to be included in each tax formula is greater here
than in the previous subsection. Note also that each such additional incen-
tive eﬀect is related to the inﬂu e n c eo fp o l i c yo nt h et i m es p e n ti ni l l e g a l
production, lu.
Since the second row of each tax formula was thoroughly discussed in the
previous subsection, we concentrate on the incentive eﬀects associated with
illegal production, which are summarized by the terms within square brackets
in the ﬁrst row. Consider ﬁrst the formula for tx.S i n c e∂˜ c/∂qc < 0, it follows
that ∂˜ lu/∂qx > 0 (<) works to decrease (increase) the optimal alcohol tax,
ceteris paribus. Therefore, if an increase in the domestic alcohol tax increases
the illegal production, which appears to be a reasonable assumption, there is
an additional cost associated with alcohol taxation. As such, this eﬀect works
18to reduce the alcohol tax further below the marginal social damage of alcohol,
implying that it strengthens the results of the previous subsection. On the
other hand, if higher alcohol taxation leads to reduced illegal production of
alcohol (which cannot be excluded on theoretical grounds), this eﬀect works
the other way around.
To interpret the second term within the square bracket, deﬁne dqc =
−[(∂˜ c/∂qx)/(∂˜ c/∂qc)]dqx to measure the change in qc necessary to hold ˜ c
constant, if qx increases marginally. Therefore, this part of the formula ex-
plores the relationship between the illegal production of alcohol and the two
commodity taxes without adding any additional distortion to the nonalco-
holic good. If dqc < 0, implying that the two goods are complements in terms
of the utility function, then ∂˜ lu/∂qc > 0 (< 0) provides an incentive to in-
crease (decrease) the alcohol tax. The intuition is that the induced eﬀect on
qc works to decrease the illegal production of alcohol, ceteris paribus. If, on
the other hand, dqc > 0, meaning that the two goods are substitutes, we have
t h eo p p o s i t ei n c e n t i v ee ﬀect, although the intuition in terms of the desire to
reduce the illegal production of alcohol remains the same. The interpretation
of the ﬁrst row in the formula for tc is analogous.
As a ﬁnal concern, let us brieﬂy analyze the marginal income tax rate.



























our result is summarized as follows;
19Proposition 4 In the presence of border trade and illegal production, eﬃ-





































The proof of Proposition 4 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 and
is, therefore, omitted. With the exception that ∂˜ xd/∂l = ∂˜ x/∂l − f(∂˜ lu/∂l)
in Proposition 4, the ﬁrst row takes the same general form, and has the same
interpretation, as the corresponding formula in the absence of illegal produc-
tion. As such, it was thoroughly discussed in the context of Proposition 2.
Let us, therefore, concentrate on the terms associated with illegal production
of alcohol, which are given in the second row. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h es e c o n d
row is likely to reduce the optimal marginal income tax rate; if ∂˜ lu/∂l<0,
so that an increase in the hours of work spent in the oﬃcial labor market re-
duces the illegal production, then there is an incentive to simulate increased
hours of work by a lower marginal income tax rate.
The second part of the second row is, in a technical sense, analogous to the
ﬁrst row; both parts of the tax formula reﬂect how the time spent in market
work aﬀects compensated demand functions. Therefore, the appearance of
the derivatives ∂˜ xd/∂l and ∂˜ c/∂l in the tax formula is no longer attributable
only to border trade (as in the previous subsection), since their presence in
the second part of the second row is a consequence of illegal production of
alcohol. The expressions ∆c and ∆x summarize how the relationships be-
tween the consumer prices and the illegal production of alcohol aﬀect the
commodity tax structure; information that was also part of (and interpreted
in the context of) Proposition 3. Here, the roles of ∆c and ∆x are to interact
20with the derivatives of the compensated demand functions with respect to
l. The intuition is that eﬃciency necessitates a broader spectrum of inter-
action eﬀects between the policy instruments than in the absence of illegal
production, indicating a greater need to use the income tax for corrective
purposes.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we characterize the optimal income and commodity tax struc-
ture in a representative agent model with border trade and illegal production
of alcohol. Alcohol is assumed to generate a negative ﬁscal external eﬀect,
which the government wants to internalize. The analysis ﬁrst concentrates
on the implications of border trade alone and then continues by simultane-
ously addressing the consequences of border trade and illegal production for
optimal taxation.
Introducing border trade in an otherwise standard model with mixed
taxation implies that we can no longer solely rely on the domestic alcohol
tax as a means of internalizing the external eﬀect. Contrary to what appears
to be the conventional wisdom underlying practical policy, this does not only
provide an incentive to reduce the alcohol tax below the marginal social
damage of alcohol; it means, more generally, that the number of variables we
would like to control via tax policy exceeds the number of policy instruments
at our disposal. In other words, it is no longer possible to implement the ﬁrst
best resource allocation (or any other resource allocation that would solve the
social planner problem in the absence of border trade). As a consequence,
the commodity taxes on other (nonalcoholic) goods as well as the income
tax should also be used for corrective purposes. The results show that the
21external eﬀect associated with alcohol consumption provides an incentive
to tax (subsidize) goods, which are complementary with (substitutable for)
alcohol. This means, in turn, that the additivity property does not apply.
The results also explain the corrective role of income taxation; if alcohol
and leisure are complements (substitutes), there will an incentive to increase
(decrease) the hours of work via the income tax system.
Adding illegal production of alcohol to the analysis strengthens one of the
main messages; the commodity tax on the nonalcoholic good and the income
tax should supplement the alcohol tax for corrective purposes. At the same
time, illegal production complicates the analysis, indicating that the basic
results described above - which are due to the eﬀects of border trade in the
absence of illegal production of alcohol - need no longer apply. Let be that
some of the additional mechanisms work in the direction of decreasing the
optimal alcohol tax further below the marginal social damage of alcohol, as
well as constitute incentives for lowering the optimal marginal income tax
rate in order to reduce the time spent on illegal production.
Appendix
The ﬁrst order conditions of the optimal tax problem are
∂L
∂l
































































22w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d−cvb = vqc and −xdvb = vqx.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let us ﬁrst use equation (A2) solve for γ and then substitute the resulting
expression into equation (A1). After some manipulations, we obtain

























Note that, by using equation (6), the left hand side of equation (A5) can
be written vbwT. Then, since ∂x/∂b = ∂xd/∂b and ∂x/∂l = ∂xd/∂l,a n d




































u = v(e(u,l,qc,q x),l,q c,q x) (A7)
˜ c(u,l,qc,q x)=c(e(u,l,qc,q x),l,q c,q x) (A8)
˜ x
d (u,l,qc,q x)=x
d (e(u,l,qc,q x),l,q c,q x) (A9)
where e(u,l,qc,q x)=b is the expenditure function. Diﬀerentiating equations
























23Substituting equations (A10) and (A11) into equation (A6) gives the tax
formula in Proposition 2.
References
[1] Aronsson, T. and Sjögren, T. (2004) Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax
Progressive in a Unionized Economy? Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics 106, 661-675.
[2] Aronsson, T. and Sjögren, T. (2004) Eﬃcient Taxation, Wage Bargain-
ing and Policy Coordination. Journal of Public Economics 88, 2711-
2725.
[3] Aronsson, T. and Blomquist, S. (2003) Optimal Taxation, Global Exter-
nalities and Labor Mobility. Journal of Public Economics 87, 2749-2764.
[4] Christiansen, V. (1984) Which Commodity Taxes should Supplement
t h eI n c o m eT a x ?Journal of Public Economics 24, 195-220.
[5] Christiansen, V. (2003) Cross-border Shopping and Tax Structure.
ERPU working paper 03-04.
[6] Crawford, I. and Tanner, S. (1995) Bringing It All Back Home: Alcohol
Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping. Fiscal Studies 16, 94-114.
[7] Crawford, I., Smith, Z. and Tanner, S. (1999) Alcohol Taxes, Tax Rev-
e n u e sa n dt h eS i n g l eE u r o p e a nM a r k e t .Fiscal Studies 20, 287-304.
[8] Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F. (2001) Second-Best Taxation of Emission
and Polluting Goods. Journal of Public Economics 80, 169-197.
24[9] Cremer, H., Gahvari, F. and Ladoux, N. (2001) Second-Best Pollution
Taxes and the Structure of Preferences. Southern Economic Journal 68,
258-280.
[10] Diamond, P. (1973) Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Correc-
tive Pricing. Bell Journal of Economics 4, 526-538.
[11] Fuest C. and Huber. B. (1997) Wage Bargaining, Labor-Tax Progression,
and Welfare. Journal of Economics 66, 127-150.
[12] Parry, I. (2003) On the Costs of Excise Taxes and Income Taxes in the
UK. International Tax and Public Finance 10, 281-304.
[13] Pirttilä, J. and Tuomala, M. (1997) Income Tax, Commodity Tax and
Environmental Policy. International Tax and Public Finance 4, 379-393.
[14] Pogue, T. and Sgontz, L. (1989) Taxing to Control Social Cost: The
Case of Alcohol. American Economic Review 79, 235-243.
[15] Sandmo, A. (1975) Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 77, 86-98.
[16] Sgontz, L. (1993) Optimal Taxation: The Mix of Alcohol and Other
Taxes. Public Finance Quarterly 21, 260-275.
[17] SOU 2004:86.
25